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Abstract 
This paper aims to critically analyze the most important determinants of the current crisis, the solutions adopted by the Romanian 
authorities and their impact on real economy. The paper studies the main causes of the current financial and economic global crisis, 
including the contagion effect that manifested, including in the case of Romanian economy. Although the starting factor is 
considered to be the uncontrolled expansion of credit, the roots of the financial crisis are deeper, such as macroeconomic and 
microeconomic, as noted by several analysts: Altman (2009), Buiter (2007) and Blanchard (2009). We consider that the two types 
of causes are interconnected. In order to analyze this idea, we use tables and graphical interpretation based on Eurostat and National 
Prognosis Commission of Romania Database. The analysis undertaken in this study aims to determine the effectiveness of policies 
implemented by Romanian authorities, analyzing the evolution of main macroeconomic indicators in the period that followed the 
crisis started using a correlation matrix for ante-crisis period 2002  2008 and the crisis one, 2009 - 2012. We found that the 
financial crisis had a strong effect on the correlation between the selected macroeconomic indicators and the majority of the links 
between the variables changed in the opposite direction. Another aspect is that after the financial crisis had begun all 
macroeconomic variables started to be stronger correlated. 
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1. Introduction 
The present global financial and economic crisis is considered to be probably the worst that occurred after the great 
inter-war economic crisis, as a matter of fact from the last 80 years. As Alan Greenspan says, this crisis is different 
from those that he experienced during his lifetime 
banking system and of the  (Greenspan, 2008). The Nobel prize laureate George Akerlof 
and professor Robert Shiller also subscribe to this opinion and they believe that this recession is different from the 
others (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010), being a generalized crisis that involves the economy as a whole and it is caused not 
only by the reduced demand, but it is also threatened by the credit crisis. Other authors (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2012) 
have even elaborated studies regarding the recent crisis that they In 
fact, in their book This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial  the authors explain that the current 
crisis manifested itself at such a scale, precisely because the authorities considered   (now 
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we are smarter and we have learned from the past mistakes) and they ignored the economic signals in the years before 
the crisis. 
  
The topic of the paper is important for the field of International Strategic Management because the most recent 
crisis is a global one and due to multiple interferences generated by the globalization, has spread to other regions, 
triggering the world economy into recession. Also, the decisions taken by authorities, in order to counteract and to 
limit its effects, are strategic ones and may affect other countries that Romania has trade relations or are developing 
foreign direct investment in our country. 
 
A large number of studies have investigated the current crisis, its main causes and the possible remedies for 
economic recovery, but this article provides empirical evidence from Romania after three years that the crisis 
manifested in our economy. Our paper contributes to the enrichment of the literature in the field through several 
proposals for the recovery of Romanian economy, still affected by the crisis. Also, our research helps to recognize 
better the apparent signals of another crisis, avoiding another one and in case that another one occurs, to present viable 
solutions to fight it. 
 
The paper is structured in five sections: in the first section we present a short characterization of the present crisis 
and in the second one we emphasize the peculiarities and the starting factors, mentioned in the economic literature, of 
the most recent financial and economic global crisis. In the third section, we concentrate our attention on the main 
implications of the crisis on the world economy and in particular, on the Romanian one, so that the next section 
presents the national decisions taken by Romanian authorities in order to limit and counteract the effects and 
their effectiveness. Finally, we present the main conclusions that we reached developing our analysis.  
2. Literature review on main factors of crisis  
Paul Krugman compares the present crisis with the Great Depression (1929-1933). He has posted on his blog a 
graph comparing the fall of the manufacturing production from the United States, from its respective mid-1929 and 
late-2007 peaks. Figure 1 shows the change in industrial production, from its previous peak in 1929-1930 and the 
2007-2009 one. As Krugman says (2009), at first, the present recession did not hit industrial production all that hard. 
But the pace accelerated dramatically during the fall of 2008, so that at this point, the U.S. economy is sort of 
experiencing half of the Great Depression. Beginning with the spring of 2008, the events took an even more serious 
turn outside the United States, with even larger falls of the manufacturing production, exports and equity prices in 
other countries. The crisis that started in the U.S. was transmitted internationally through trade flows, capital flows 
(Almunia et al., 2009) became just as global. 
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Fig. 1 The fall in industrial production in 1929-1930 and 2007-2009. Fig. 1 Legend: GD  Great Depression; GR  Great Recession. Source: data 
processed by the author from http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/industrial-production. 
The opinions regarding the elements that started the crisis differ even among the renowned experts on this subject. 
The causes of the crisis are complex, but without pretending to counterpoint a personal point of view comparable in 
level, we are trying further on to present the ones that we consider to be mainly guilty of starting the present crisis.  
Thus, among the main basic factors that initiated crisis, we could mention:  
 The limits of the American model of economic growth based on credit and consumption demand; 
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 The strong disequilibrium of the U.S. financial markets ; 
 The financial innovations and big development of derivative products markets; 
 The high yields obtained by the operators from the financial markets; 
 The excessive growth of the credit volume that was not accompanied by a parallel growth of the domestic 
voluntary savings (De Soto, 2010): the low level of the interest rate practiced by Fed during 2001-2004 (1%  
2.25%) led to a high growth rate of the credit volume, that, in its turn led to a speculative advance materialized in 
the subs
 
 The increase of the interest rate during 2001-2006 (from 1% to 5.25%) and the expiry of the periods for which the 
guarantees were granted led to the explosive increase of the volume of not-reimbursed credits; 
 The correction of the speculative increase of the housing prices added to the fall of the mortgage credit market. 
 
Other authors (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010) found only three causes of the credit crisis: 
 The collapse of the standard credit manner and the resorting to speculative financing and Ponzi financing, two 
concepts that Minsky (2011) developed in his work and that explained the starting of the current crisis; 
 The relationship between the capital loss and the degree of indebtedness of the institutions that granted the loans or 
that generated them  depositary banks, investment banks and financial holding companies; 
 The use of the already promised credit lines. 
 
Alan Greenspan (2008) considered that the main factors that started the crisis were the permissive and fraudulent 
practices of mortgage lending, the lacking judgment securitizing of the credit products and the excessive use of the 
short term borrowed funds in order to finance the long term assets. More simply, the financial crisis started as a result 
of the credit policy artificial expansion (De Soto, 2010), allowed by the central banks that offered credits at very low 
interest rates (even negative in real terms), without them being accompanied by the corresponding savings. In that 
context, a speculative advance occurred (
that turned into the economic recession. Under those circumstances, the most obvious starting elements were the 
increase of the price on raw materials, especially on oil, the crisis of the subprime mortgages from the U.S. and finally 
the bankruptcy of some major banking institutions (De Soto, 2010). 
 
As we have said in the beginning of this study, the collapse of housing prices and the subprime mortgage market in 
the United States are not the unique factors that determined the crisis.  In Altman  he crisis' underlying 
cause was the (invariably lethal) combination of very low interest rates and unprecedented levels of liquidity  
(Altman, 2009). The low interest rates reflected the U.S. government's overly accommodating monetary policy after 
9/11 (The U.S. Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate to nearly 1% in late 2001 and maintained it near that 
very low level for three years.) The liquidity reflected, among other factors, what Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke 
(2005) has called the global savings glut : the enormous financial surpluses realized by certain countries, particularly 
China, Singapore, and the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf. Until the mid-1990s, most emerging economies ran 
balance-of-payments deficits as they imported capital to finance their growth. But the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
98, among other things, changed this in much of Asia. After that, surpluses grew throughout the region and then were 
consistently recycled back to the West in the form of portfolio investments and sophisticated financial instruments, 
difficult to understand by some investors.  
 
Buiter (2007) considered that the current crisis had micro and macroeconomic causes. Among the microeconomic 
factors mentioned: wanton securitization  cyclical 
behaviour of leverage in much of the financial system and of the Basel capital adequacy requirements, privately 
rational but socially inefficient disintermediation and competitive international de-regulation. In his opinion, there are 
two macroeconomic causes that contributed to the crisis: first, excessive global liquidity creation by key central banks 
(particularly the Fed and the ECB) and, second, an ex-ante global saving glut, brought about by the entry of a number 
of high-saving countries (notably China) into the global economy and by the global redistribution of wealth and 
income towards commodity exporters that also had, at least in the short run, high propensities to save. Blanchard 
(2009) joined the same opinion. 
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In the economic literature, there are also opinions (Rodriguez and Rallo, 2011), which consider that the fault of the 
severe economic crisis of the past half decade belongs to state intervention in the financial system. In this context, 
Rodriguez and Rallo (2011) applied the Austrian theory of business cycle to demonstrate that people were wrong 
when they considered liberalism as the political culprit of the crisis; greed as the moral culprit of the crisis and free 
market as the economic culprit. Also, they do not agree with the rescuing banks in difficulty according to the principle 
expenditures in order to create jobs. 
 
However, the mechanism that leads to the crisis is the following one: a positive shock generates a wave of 
optimism that feeds into lower risk aversion, greater leverage and higher asset prices which then feed back into even 
more optimism, leverage and higher asset prices. Sceptics will claim that asset prices cannot grow forever at such a 
high rate, but the enthusiasts will answer that this time it is different. If the boom lasts long enough, even some of the 
sceptics will end up believing that this time it is indeed different. Those who remain sceptical will be marginalized. 
But, at some point, the asset bubble will burst and the deleveraging process, the debt deflation and the economic crisis 
will begin. Finally, in our opinion, the collapse of the market for subprime mortgages in the United States was the 
spark that ignited the crisis, but it is not its fundamental cause. At the root of the current crisis are more causes, among 
which, the most important were the global imbalances and the underestimation of risk that led to excessive leverage in 
the years before the crisis. 
 
Regarding Romania, it was affected through the contagion effect, given the very high dependence of the public and 
private sector upon the foreign capitals, to which, major macroeconomic imbalances added (current account deficit, 
public structural deficit etc.) accumulated by the national economy during the previous period, when the financial 
world manifested turbulences. 
3. Impact of the crisis on the Romanian economy   
The fast propagation of the crisis from the US to different countries, big or small, proves that there is a growing 
interdependency between national economies due to an intense market globalization, including the financial ones 
(Stiglitz, 2010). The Central and Eastern European countries are worse hit by the recession as their economic 
expansion relied more on external funding that has dried up as the effects are felt in more developed economies. 
The effects of international financial crisis were extended to the Romanian economy, too. However, in terms of direct 
impact, the banking system was less affected because it was not exposed to toxic assets, prudential and administrative 
measures being taken over time by the National Bank of Romania-NBR . The closer connection of the 
Romanian economy to the international economic flows (real and capital) favoured the catching up process during 
2000 2008, but the spreading of the economic-financial crisis from the U.S. and Europe also affected the Romanian 
economy, that from a growth of 7.3% of GDP in 2008 it found itself in the situation to experience in 2009 a significant 
decrease of GDP of 7.1%. At the same time, the budget deficit in 2009 increased from 8.3% of GDP compared to 
5.4% of GDP during the previous year (NBR, 2009). 
 
In Romania, although, the impact of the financial crisis on the economy was major, it had mainly manifested itself 
indirectly. The transmission of the impact of the crisis was done through five channels :  
 The external commerce channel - as a result of the reduction of the main export markets for the Romanian 
products. The dynamics of the world economy have re-entered positive territory (5.1% in 2010 versus -0.5% in 
2009), but the outlook points to a risk of slower growth rates. Countries are expected to post relatively significant 
dynamics differences, reflecting specific structural and incidental conditions, which may put pressure on global 
financial stability. According to the European Comm as most 
likely be among the economies with relatively slow growth rates, i.e. 1.5 percent against 2.9 percent, the average 
for the CEE countries (NBR, 2011), but the country is expected to resume faster growth starting with 2012. 
 The financial channel - on the background of external private credit lines  from the parent banks, with 
impact on the evolution of the non-governmental credit. In Romania, after the onset of the crisis, parent banks 
further contributed with capital to their Romanian subsidiaries, ensuring more than 95% of the external financing 
attracted by the latter in 2010 (NBR, 2011). 
 The trust channel - through the increase of the aversion to risk of the foreign investors. In July 2011, Fitch rating 
-crisis level, i.e. BBB-
Moreover, the credibility of government policies allowed further access to external financing even in the periods 
when global investors exhibited a stronger risk aversion (NBR, 2011). 
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 The foreign exchange channel - due to the depreciation pressure of the national currency (RON). 
 The wealth and balance effect channel - at the same time, with the substantial reduction in the value of several 
categories of assets, especially real estate, dominant within the asset class used as banking collateral, as well as 
through the increase of bad loans ratio in the assets of the credit institutions. In 2010, net wealth of the population 
decreased by 8% compared to 2009, due to the decline in prices of real estate assets that held the largest share 
(NBR, 2011). 
 
Given the important effects of the global financial crisis, it is necessary to find solutions in order to limit and 
counteract the effects of the current financial and economic global crisis. 
4. Policy responses to the crisis 
The current crisis has required an immediate response by governments to avoid a collapse of the financial and 
banking systems and to limit the economic effects of the credit crunch. Such policies aim at stabilizing the economy 
and initiating a rapid recovery. But policies also need to ensure that the recovery is durable, i.e. based on sustainable 
growth. As the crisis has moved to a global economic slowdown, many countries have pursued expansionary monetary 
policy to stimulate economic activity (Nanto, 2009). This has included lowering interest rates and expanding the 
money supply. The current financial and economic crisis largely abolished the capacity of automatic stabilizers to 
respond as they did in the past 50 years to the fluctuations that have affected the world economy, which is why most 
affected countries have already adopted fiscal stimulus programs. The research of Almunia et al. (2009) suggests that 
fiscal policy is playing an important role in counteracting the effects of the crisis. Also, the studies done by Deloitte 
(2009) and OECD (2009) show that almost all countries had adopted fiscal decisions in order to diminish the effects of 
the crisis. Although fiscal packages are expansionary in most OECD countries, restrictive discretionary measures have 
also been taken as a response to the crisis and are included. In a few countries, the overall package is restrictive 
(particularly, in Hungary, Iceland and Ireland).  
 
In this section, we analyze the solutions used in Romania in order to limit and counteract the effects of the crisis 
and their implications on economy (GDP, the unemployment rate, the real wage gains, the fiscal position, etc.). For 
this purpose, we analyze the evolution of these indicators in order to highlight the effectiveness of the adopted 
measures.  In the context of the pressure of the international financial crisis, we consider that national governments 
and regional/international financial organizations had managed to avoid the extension and generalization of crisis. 
Economic and financial crisis, beyond the problems it generates at micro and macro level, has to result in an 
adjustment of mechanisms, institutions and financial and monetary policy applied to the real economy. The economic 
growth resumed internationally, but developments in the countries and regions highlight relatively large dynamic 
differences and uncertainties trends on future growth. The main external challenges to the financial stability in 
Romania, such as extension , by contagion, and the risk of economic slowdown in 
partner countries ask for continued efforts to maintain the macroeconomic balances. 
4.1. Anti-crisis measures adopted by Romanian authorities  
Due to the fact that in 2009, the budget deficit reached the level of 8.3% of GDP, the Romanian government 
adopted in July 2010 a serie of fiscal consolidation measures consisting in the temporary reduction by 25% of the 
salaries from the public sector, the reduction by 15% of the social expenses and the increase of the VAT rate by 5 
percentage points (from 19% to 24%). Also, from October 1, 2010, the public authorities eliminated the minimum tax 
and kept tax flat at 16%; i.e., two thirds of measures taken were centred on controlling and reducing government 
expenditures and a third focused on increasing the government revenue. According to the forecast made by public 
authorities, general government deficit was going to be close to 10% of GDP in 2009 and 14% of GDP in 2010 and 
2011 in the absence of austerity measures taken by the government (Romanian Government, 2012b). 
 
Also, in Romania, the following tax measures were taken to address the effects of global financial crisis:  
 During 2009 and 2010, dividends were exempted from the tax if there were going to be distributed and reinvested 
of securing and creating new jobs;  
 Also, starting with 2009, an additional 20% deduction was applicable for qualifying R&D expenses and accelerated 
depreciation applied to equipment used for R&D activities; 
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 As from January 1, 2009, interest income derived from term deposits and/or other saving instruments was 
considered to be non-taxable income when derived by individuals. If such individuals were residents in non-EU 
member states, such income would be exempted from the withholding tax in Romania. 
 
At the same time, among the possible solutions, stipulated in the document elaborated by the Romanian 
Package of Measures for the Stimulation of the Economic A  (2012a), are mentioned: 
the improvement of the infrastructure through the rapid absorption of European funds; public-private partnerships and 
fiscal consolidation that will create fiscal space for the increase of the capital expenditures and defining the priorities 
regarding the governmental revenue, as follows: reduction of tax evasion, elimination of exceptions and increase of 
the taxation basis, simplification of the tax system, alignment of the asset tax to the European standards (increase of 
the asset inventory taxes), increase of the non-fiscal incomes; as well as stimulation measures of the private 
investments by offering benefits or subventions. 
4.2. Results obtained from the policies implemented 
The measures adopted by public authorities have avoided an economic collapse that would have occurred if they 
had continued the policies and structural deficits from 2008 to 2009 and 2010. Also, these measures have stabilized 
the Romanian economy, creating the prerequisites for economic recovery in 2011 estimated at 2.5%, compared with 
2010 (National Prognosis Commission, 2012) due to increased exports and gradual strengthening of domestic demand, 
as seen in the table below. 
Table 1 Forecast of main macroeconomic indicators (change from previous year %) 
Indicators 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GDP-real increase 7.3 -6.6 -1.6 2.5 1.7 
Unemployment rate at the end of the year 4.4 7.8 7.0 5.12 4.6 
Real wage gains 16.5 -1.5 -3.7 0.5 1.2 
Source: National Prognosis Commission,  (March 2012), Forecasts of main macroeconomic indicators for 2012. 
 
Also, from the Table 1, we can observe that the measure consisting in the 25% decrease of the salaries in the public 
sector in July 2010 is reflected by reducing wage gains by 3.7% in 2010.  Later, in 2011 a slight increase of 0.5% is 
recorded compared with the previous year, due to an increase in salaries (previously reduced) by 15%. The evolution 
of Romanian economy is also reflected by the level of unemployment rate that, when the crisis started in our country, 
reach the highest level of 7.8%, but thereafter according to forecasts (National Prognosis Commission, 2012), it will 
drop to 4.6 in 2012. 
 
The fiscal consolidation measures have helped to reduce the budget deficit from 7.3% of GDP in 2009 to 6.5% in 
2010 and 4.4% in 2011 (Romanian Government, 2011). The increase of the revenues was achieved by: increasing the 
standard rate of VAT from 19% to 24%; increasing the rate of excise duties on energy products, tobacco and alcohol; 
increasing the taxes payable by individuals who have multiple real estate properties and the tax for vehicles with a 
cylinder capacity exceeding 2000 cc; increasing the collection of taxes by reducing tax evasion; broadening the tax 
base by taxing the interest income, the vouchers, the gift vouchers and other financial bonuses earned by individuals; 
extending the basis of health insurance contribution of 5.5% on pension higher than 740 RON per month. As a result, 
the consolidated budgetary position for 2012-2014 reflects a evolution of revenue from 33.9% to 34.0% of GDP 
compared with that for the period 2009-2011 of 31.6 to 33.2% of GDP (Table 2 and Figure 2), taking into 
consideration the trajectory of economic recovery growth estimated at 1.8% -2.3% for 2012 and 4.2% for 2014 
(National Prognosis Commission, 2011). 
Table 2 Budgetary position (% of GDP) 
Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Budgetary revenue 31.6 32.8 33.6 33.9 34 33.9 
Budgetary expenditures 38.9 39.4 38 36.9 36.5 36.1 
Deficit  -7.3 -6.5 -4.4 -3 -2.5 -2.2 
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Fig. 2 Budgetary position 
In terms of reducing government expenditures, the effort to adjust current expenditures (as an effect of the 
measures taken to reduce the salaries of public sector employees) makes it possible to maintain on medium term an 
up-warm trend (Figure 3) of the public investments (an increase of 1.3 percentage points of GDP in 2012 compared to 
2011), and a strong reduction of deficit by 2.1 percentage points of GDP in 2011 compared to 2010 (Romanian 
Government, 2011). Therefore, given the fact that the effort will be focused on reducing the deficit, the governmental 
expenditures for investments will play an important role in fiscal policy. 
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Fig.3 Post-crisis adjustment of public expenditures (billon of RON) 
Regarding the government debt, calculated according to the EU methodology, we notice that after the crisis started 
the level of total debt increased at 30.8% of GDP at the end of 2010 from 23.5% in 2009 and this will increase to  
32.2% of GDP in 2014 (Figure 4).  
 
Fig. 4 The evolution of governmental debt (percentage of GDP). Source: Eurostat Database. 
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We emphasize the fact that, at the end of 2010, Romania ranked among the least indebted four EU member states 
and therefore, we estimate that the medium term debt level will stand among the lowest of the member states. The 
Maastricht, meaning that the governmental debt lies within sustainable limits. 
 
In order to highlight the correlation between the analyzed variables, we used a correlation matrix for ante-crisis 
period 2002  2008 and the crisis one, 2009 - 2012, as presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 Correlation matrix for ante-crisis period 2002  2008* and crisis period 2009  2012 
Correlation Budgetary 
expenditures 
Budgetary 
revenue 
Deficit External debt GDP real 
increase 
Unemployment 
Budgetary 
 expenditures 
1.00000 
1.00000 
     
Budgetary  
revenue 
0.821157 
-0.738291 
1.00000 
1.00000 
    
Deficit -0.915722 -0.522986 1.00000    
 -0.929859 0.934517 1.00000    
External 
 debt 
0.905453 
-0.562391 
0.590829 
0.728402 
-0.937795 
0.827119 
1.00000 
1.00000 
  
GDP real  
increase 
0.292090 
-0.649680 
0.175813 
0.980200 
-0.296147 
0.874942 
0.195204 
0.976639 
1.00000 
1.00000 
 
Unemployment -0.803788 
0.880754 
-0.536096 
-0.961021 
0.830885 
-0.987036 
-0.936561 
-0.874738 
0.081259 
-0.932184 
1.00000 
1.00000 
Notes:* Correlation values for this period are written in italic.  based on Eurostat and National Prognosis 
Commission of Romania Database.  
 
If we look at the data above, we can see that the financial crisis had a strong effect on the correlation between the 
selected macroeconomic indicators and the majority of the links between the variables changed in the opposite 
direction. Another aspect is that after the financial crisis had begun all macroeconomic variables are strongly 
correlated. 
 
Regarding the budgetary expenditures, only the relationship with the deficit is the same before and during the 
crisis  period, while their 
values recorded for the period before the crisis reflects the opinion in the economic literature, that state that an 
increase in the public expenditures can be based on increasing public revenue, on increasing debt or on economic 
growth. However, due to financial crisis, we are able to see that the things have changed, because this normal link 
between the budgetary expenditures and the other macroeconomic variable has been broken. The same thing is 
recorded for the relationship between expenditures and unemployment. Moreover, the increase in budgetary revenues 
is not sufficient to determine a decrease in the deficit after the crisis begun due to a highly positive correlation between 
the two variables. Based on our analysis, even if, before the crisis, we can say that no link exists between the GDP real 
increase and unemployment, after 2009, there is a strong negative correlation between these two variables, which is 
the right way to be.  
 
Regarding the decision of Romanian authorities to diminish the public expenditures, in particular public sector 
employment expenditures, from the correlation matrix, we can notice that this decision has determined the increase in 
GDP. This effect can be explained taking into account the previous considerations regarding the diminishing of 
employment expenditures in order to maintain an medium term an up-warm trend of the public investments, that 
justifies the expected economic growth. On the other hand, the correlation between budgetary revenue and real GDP 
increase during the 2009-2012 period shows that the increase of budgetary revenue (as a result of the taken decision to 
increase taxes) contributes to economic growth. Our analysis might have some limitations due to the use of two 
databases, Eurostat Database for ante-crisis period 2002-2008 and National Prognosis Commission of Romania 
Database for the crisis one, 2009-2012. 
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Our forecasts and expected results of the policies implemented as a response to the crisis have taken into account 
that economic and financial developments will improve and the economy will start growing again, so that GDP can 
increase as predicted.  economic recovery, affected by the crisis, is difficult and somewhat delayed due to 
the imbalances accumulated during the period before the crisis (as a result of the pro cyclical policies).   
 
The year 2012 is still under the auspices of the current crisis and presents further uncertainties and risks, given that 
the world economy seems to recover slowly from the crisis, the financial tensions accumulated in some EU member 
states, and the fact that each state has a different behaviour under the circumstances, including Romania. At this post-
crisis recovery stage, the economic growth still faces a number of significant obstacles. Recent developments in 
financial markets have shown that while overall conditions are significantly better than last year, the situation remains 
relatively uncertain. A negative impact, that could change our forecasts, could be the difficulties associated with 
external debt of euro zone member states. 
5. Conclusions 
Many studies, including ours, have been written about the current crisis and they have attempted to identify and to 
analyze its main factors in order to offer responses and solutions to this global challenge. Our paper is only a first 
attempt on a more extensive project that aims to study, to analyze and to argue the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic effects of the global crisis on Romanian economy and also the effectiveness of policy responses to the 
crisis. This study provides empirical evidence from Romania after three years that the crisis has manifested in our 
country. Our article contributes to the enrichment of the literature in the field through several proposals for the 
recovery of Romanian economy, still affected by the crisis. Thus, our research helps to recognize better the apparent 
signals of another crisis, avoiding another one and in case that another one occurs, to present viable solutions to fight 
it. 
 
The main cause of the current financial crisis was ample liquidity created by the world's major central banks (FED, 
ECB) and the willingness of oil and gas exporting countries to limit currency appreciation. Also, there was a saturation 
of savings generated by the increasing integration into the global economy of some countries (China, South-East Asia) 
with high rates of accumulation and by the global redistribution of wealth and income to exporters of goods such as 
oil, gas, etc. created available resources for investments, including the investments in 
sophisticated financial instruments, not easily understood by some investors. 
 
The consequences of abundant liquidity consist in very low interest rates and their low volatility. Together, these 
effects have led to an increased appetite for assets with large gains. In addition, the reduced market volatility has 
created a tendency to underestimate the true risk and a lack of vigilance from investors. Risk margins were also very 
low and non-discriminatory. Together, low interest rates, appetite for assets with high returns, low vigilance toward 
risk and low margins masked the price signals on financial markets and led to insufficient understanding of the 
involved risks. In this context, the microeconomic causes are added, worsening the situation: rampant securitization, 
fundamental flaws in the  cyclical behaviour of leverage in much of the financial 
system and of the Basel capital adequacy requirements, privately rational but socially inefficient disintermediation, 
and competitive international de-regulation. 
 
It is too late to change the initial conditions for this crisis. So, we subscribe to Blanchard opinion (2009) that 
current policies should be aimed at limiting the two amplification mechanisms at work at this juncture. Future 
regulations and policies should also aim however to avoid a repeat of some of those initial conditions. In short, we 
need to both limit current effects and counter the effects in the future. To conclude, more work will be needed to 
monitor the implementation and assess the impact of these economic recovery measures in order to ensure the renewal 
of sustainable growth of Romanian economy, aspects that we will analyze in future research. 
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